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Custom's Method and Process 
Lessons from Humanitarian Law 
Monica Hakimi 
A central question in the literature on customary international law (CIL) goes to 
method: what is the proper method for "finding" CIL - that is, for determining that 
particular norms qualify as ClL?' The traditional method is to identify a widespread 
state practice, plus evidence that states believe that the practice reflects the law 
(opinio juris). That method has long been criticized as incoherent, unworkable, and 
out of touch with modern sensibilities.' Thus, much of the CIL literature addresses 
its perceived problems. The principal goals of this literature are to help resolve 
whether norms that are claimed to be CIL are really CIL, and thus to reduce the 
volatility and susceptibility to abuse in CIL. 
I argue in this chapter that the method for finding CIL might be so elusive because 
the question itself is misconceived. The question of how to find CIL presupposes 
that finding CIL is an objective exercise and somehow removed from the process 
for making CIL. This process is notoriously undisciplined and politically charged. 
To make CIL, disparate actors advance and respond to one another's legal claims, 
' See, e.g., Int'! Law Comm'n, First Report on Fomwtion and Evidence of Customary International 
Law (by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur), 4! 22, UN Doc. A/CN-4f663 (May 17, 2013) [hereinafter 
Wood's First Report] (reviewing literature on method and asserting that the goal of the International 
Law Commission's project is to "provide guidance on how to identify a rule of customary international 
law"); International Law Association [ILA], Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law, at 4 (2000) [hereinafter "ILA Report"] ("[I]t was felt that what 
would be most useful was ... some practical guidance" for finding CIL.). 
' See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, "The Identification of International Law," in INTE:RNATIONAL 
LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 3, 4-6 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982) (describing the method as incoherent 
and full of"inner mysteries"); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995) 
("The definition is easy to state but riot easy to interpret and apply, and it continues to raise difficult 
questions, some 'operational,' some conceptual-jurisprudential."); Jonathan I. Charney, "Universal 
International Law," 87 AM. /. INT'L L. 529, 543-45 (1993) (arguing that the traditional method is 
inapt, given the increased number and diversity of states and the expanded subjects of international 
regulation). 
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as they pursue their own interests.> The methodological question assumes that CIL 
finding is distinct - that actors who find CIL do not advance their own agendas 
but rather assess the evidence objectively and thus that their decisions help settle 
CIL and weed out invalid claims. I use the recent rise of CIL in international 
humanitarian law to show that these assumptions are flawed. CIL finding is deeply 
entangled with CIL making. The two exercises operate in much the same way and 
through the same process, so they share similar limitations. 
My argument has two practical implications. First, nonstate actors who are 
charged with finding CIL can be extremely influential in making CIL. Some of 
these actors play a much larger role in the formation of CIL than the literature now 
recognizes. Second, no particular method for finding CIL is capable of disciplining 
global actors or imposing order on CIL, because the process for making CIL is so 
heavily undisciplined and disordered. 
THE QUESTION OF METHOD 
The frustrations with finding CIL stem directly from the nature of the CIL process. 
This process is chaotic, unstructured, and politically charged. The participants 
make and respond to competing claims on the law as they advance their own 
agendas. Because the process lacks any structure, these claims and counterclaims 
can take multiple forms and appear in varied arenas. Some CIL claims are advanced 
collectively, such as through international organizations.4 Others appear in national 
documents or press briefings. Still others are communicated nonverbally, as states 
act and react in concrete cases. In short, the process produces vast amounts of 
disconnected raw data disparate claims and counterclaims on an issue. 
The methodological question asks how to identify the claims that pass successfully 
through that process and emerge as CIL. For all the attention that that question 
receives, its answer is still only rudimentary and shifty. Consider three methodological 
guideposts that will again be relevant in the discussion on international humanitarian 
law. First, there is broad agreement that states generate almost all of the relevant 
input for finding CIL.s The extent to which other kinds of actors participate in CIL's 
i See Myers S. McDougal, Editorial Comment, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of 
the Sea," 49AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 357 (1955) (describing the process as one of "continuous interaction ... 
in which the decision-makers ... unilaterally put forward claims ... and in which other decision-
makers ... weigh and appraise these competing claims ... and ultimately accept or reject them"). 
4 See Charney, supra note 2, at 543-50. 
s Int'! Law Comm'n, Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law (by Michael 
Wood, Special Rapporteur), Draft Conclusion 5, UN Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter 
"Wood's Second Report"] ("[I]t is primarily the practice of States that contributes to the creation, 
or expression, of rules of customary international law."); Christiana Ochoa, "The Individual and 
Customary International Law Formation," 48 VA. J. INT'L L 119, 135 (2007) ("What is remarkable in 
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formation is unclear. For example, the dominant position in the CIL literature is that 
international courts and tribunals do not help make CIL.6 Judicial decisions do not 
qualify as state practice and are, at best, only indirect evidence of opinio juris. Yet as a 
practical matter, global actors rely on these decisions to determine whether particular 
norms qualify as CIL that is, to find CIL.7 Separately, state-comprised bodies of 
international organizations, such as the UN General Assembly, are known to participate 
in the formation of CIL. Questions remain on when these bodies participate,8 and on 
the extent to which bodies that are not comprised of states also participate.9 
Second, a CIL finding will be uncontroversial if the data clearly show a widespread 
state practice plus strong evidence of opinio juris. But where - as is usually the 
case - the data are inconsistent or ambiguous, the independence and relative weight 
of each of those elements is contested.w Some argue that CIL may be found on the 
basis of the practice alone, without much evidence of opinio furis. ll Others argue the 
opposite. 12 Still others contend that a bounty of one element can compensate for a 
dearth of the other. '3 And those who accept that both elements might be necessary 
this literature is that virtually all of it has accepted the core premise that only states can form CIL."); 
Yoram Dinstein, "The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties," 322 RECUEIL 
DES CouRs 243, 267 (2006) ("[States] have a quasi-monopoly over the formation of custom."). 
6 See, e.g., ILA Report, supra note I, at 18 ("Although international courts and tribunals ultimately 
derive their authority from States, it is not appropriate to regard their decisions as a form of State 
practice."); Dinstein, supra note 5, at 317 ("[I)nternational judicial bodies not being the organs of 
any single State never contribute as such to the practice of States."). 
7 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, •j 495 (Sept. 2 1998) (citing an 
ICJ decision to find that the Genocide Convention reflects CIL); Panel Report, Korea - Measures 
Affecting Government Procurement, 4J 7.123, WT/DS163/R (May i, 2000) ("Since this article has been 
derived largely from the case law of the ... PCIJ and the IC}, there can be little doubt that it presently 
represents customary international law."). 
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, tj 70 (July 
8) ("General Assembly resolutions ... can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris."). 
9 Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 
1951 I.C.J. 15, 22 (May 28) (considering tl1e UN Secretary General's statement but suggesting that 
other evidence was weightier); Wood's Second Report, supra note 5, at •j 43 (asserting that secretariats 
can produce relevant data but that such data should be given less weight than the output of bodies 
that are comprised of states). 
'
0 Wood's Second Report, supra note 5, at 4J 3(a) ("[I]t was recognized that the two elements may 
sometimes be 'closely entangled,' and that the relative weight to be given to each may vary according 
to the circumstances."). 
" See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Comment, "Customary International Law: A Reformulation," 4 IN1"L 
LEGAL THEORY i (1998); Maurice H. Mendelson, "The Formation of Customary International Law," 
272 RECUEfL. DES COURS 155, 250, 289 (1998). 
" See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, "Saving Customary International Law," 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 153 
(2005); Rudolf Bernhardt, "Custom and Treaty in tl1e Law of tl1e Sea," 205 RECUEIL DES CotJRS 247, 
266 (1987). 
'J See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., "Custom on a Sliding Scale," 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146 (1987); ILA Report, 
supra note I, at 40. 
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still debate whether the same evidence may be "double counted," once as state 
practice and then again as opinio juris. '4 
Third, treaties and CIL are known to interact, but the question of how they 
interact in particular contexts - that is, what a treaty provision signifies for CIL and 
vice versa - remains open-ended. The International Law Association's high-profile 
study on CIL summarized the conventional wisdom as follows: a treaty provision 
might be irrelevant to the formation of CIL, it might reflect preexisting CIL, or it 
might help create CIL. 15 Although the International Law Association did not say 
so, most scholars accept that CIL can also, in rare cases, displace a contrary treaty 
provision. 16 The upshot is that a treaty provision cannot be presumed to have any 
one of these effects; the provision must be assessed in light of the other evidence for 
and against the CIL claim.'7 
All of this imprecision in the method for finding CIL breeds uncertainty in CIL 
and is thought to weaken it as a source of law. 18 A CIL finding might well turn on 
how a particular decisionmaker interprets the raw data; whether she considers only 
data generated by states or also other kinds of data; whether she focuses more on 
the operational practice or on the opinio juris; and what she makes of any treaty 
provision on the issue. As the methodological variance expands, so too does the 
range of plausible interpretations of the raw data - and the indeterminacy on the 
CIL status and substantive content of the putative norm. 
Many scholars argue that the indeterminacy undercuts CIL's efficacy in shaping 
state behavior.'9 They argue that, because CIL allows so much discretion at the 
'4 ILA Report, supra note 1, at 7. 
'5 ILA Report, supra note 1, at 43-48; see also Wood's First Report, supra note 1, at 4J 34 ("[I]t is generally 
recognized that treaties may be reflective of pre-existing rules of customary international law; generate 
new rules and serve as evidence of their existence; or ... have a crystallizing effect for emerging rules 
of customary international law."). 
•
6 See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
'7 II.A Report, supra note 1, at 43-48; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, "Withdrawing from 
International Custom," 120 YALE L.J. 202, 213 (2010) ("[A]lthough treaty and CIL obligations 
frequently overlap, there is debate over whether and to what extent treaties can serve as evidence of 
CIL."). 
•
8 See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (i971) 
("When the rules for finding the rules of law are themselves vague or ambiguous, law becomes 
unpredictable."). 
'9 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, "Customary International Law in the 21st 
Century," in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 197 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies 
eds., 2008) ("This lack of a defining procedure creates considerable confusion as to the content of CIL 
and its relevance to state behavior."); K Wolfke, "Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary 
International Law," 24 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 15 (i993) (noting "the frequently expressed doubts 
about the present usefulness of customary international law" and asserting that, "[ c )onsidering the 
complexity, imprecision and relative slowness of international custom as a law-generating instrument, 
such doubts seem to be fully justified"). 
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point of application, it invites states to make CIL claims that evade regulation. 20 
These claims can be difficult to refute because the CIL process is, at bottom, 
decentralized: no actor is formally designated to settle CIL or, in most cases, to apply 
a putative norm to specific facts. Moreover, even if CIL can effectively regulate 
states on some issues, its fluidity and lack of structure might make it particularly 
ill-suited for addressing complex modern problems, like climate change and nuclear 
nonproliferation. Such problems typically demand detailed regulation, tradeoffs 
among differently situated states, and some institutional oversight. 21 
Separately, CIL's indeterminacy is said to undercut its legitimacy as law. The 
argument here is that, because CIL is so malleable, it is easily infected by factors, such 
as raw power, that ought to be exogenous to the law.22 For example, Jean d'Aspremont 
recently proclaimed that many CIL norms are so "dangerously indeterminate" 
that "their authority is gravely enfeebled."23 Fernando Tes6n characterizes as 
deeply problematic what he calls "fake custom" - "pieces of advocacy disguised as 
law."24 The idea that CIL is easily abused or opportunistically invoked is sprinkled 
throughout the CIL literature. 25 
'° This kind of argument is commonly made not just about CIL but about ambiguity in international 
law more generally. See, e.g., )EAN o'ASPREMONT, FORMAUSM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 29-30 (2oll) (asserting that "uncertainty regarding the existence of international legal rules 
prevents them from providing for meaningful commands" or "generating any change in the behavior 
of its addressees"); Andrew T. Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law," 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1863 (2002) ("As the uncertainty of an obligation increases, the reputational cost 
from a violation decreases."); Thomas M. Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System," 82 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 705, 714 (1988) ("Indeterminate normative standards not only make it harder to know what 
conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance."). 
" See Niels Peterson, "Customaiy International Law and Public Goods" (in this volume); Joel 
Trachtman, "The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law" (in this volume). 
" See e.g.,). Patrick Kelly, "The Twilight of Customary International Law," 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 451 
\2000) (asserting that, because CIL is indeterminate, "it cannot function as a legitimate source of 
substantive legal norms"); Philip R. Trimble, "A Revisionist View of Customary International Law," 33 
UCLA L. REv. 665, 716-31 (1986). Like the efficacy argument, this legitimacy argument is made not 
just about CIL but about ambiguous international legal norms more generally. See, e.g., Thomas M. 
Franck, "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power 
Disequilibrium," loo AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 93 (2006) (arguing that the most important element of a 
norm's legitimacy is its determinacy); Martti Koskenniemi, "Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility 
as a New International Order?" 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 337, 341 (2002) ("[V]ague clauses would give 
too much room for political abuse."). 
'l o'ASPREMONT, supra note 20, at 164 (emphasis added). 
'+ Fernando R. Tes6n, "Fake Custom," in CUSTOMARY LAW (Brian Lepard ed., forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2527523. 
'5 ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2007) ("Uncertainties 
about the existence and content of rules of customary law allow opp01tunistic claims."); Pierre-Hugues 
Verdier & Erik Voeten, "Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International Law: An 
Explanatory Theory," 108 AM. /. INT'L L. 389, 413 (2014) ("[S]tates often appear to assess state practice 
opportunistically in the context of specific disputes or when arguing for a desired rule."). 
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These criticisms of CIL are largely what motivate the persistent focus on 
method: if the method for finding CIL were more refined, states and other global 
actors would have less discretion to characterize as CIL their own, parochial policy 
preferences - and the uncertainty and susceptibility to abuse that are the hallmarks 
of CIL might be reduced. Indeed, the International Law Commission has explained 
its current project on CIL in precisely these terms: 
The view was expressed that the ambiguities surrounding the identification of 
customary international law had given rise to legal uncertainty and instability, as 
well as opportunistic or bad faith arguments regarding the existence of a rule of 
customary international law. The proposed effort to clarify the process by which 
a rule of customary international law is identified was thus generally welcomed.26 
Of course, those who focus on method recognize that CIL finding involves some 
interpretive discretion. Still, the goal is to limit that discretion by making the exercise 
more methodologically disciplined. 
In short, although different methods vary in the relevance and weight that they 
attribute to particular data, they all present the same detached question: do the data 
support this or that CIL claim? The methods also have similar goals: to help resolve 
whether norms that are claimed to be CIL are really CIL and thus to reduce the 
volatility and political excess in CIL. And they rest on a set of common assumptions. 
They assume that CIL finding is an objective exercise - and thus that it stands apart 
from and can impose order on the process for making CIL. The recent experience in 
international humanitarian law (IHL), the law that governs the conduct of hostilities 
in wartime, suggests that these assumptions do not hold. CIL finding is entangled 
with CIL making and part of the same chaotic process. 
THE DEMAND FOR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Customary IHL presents a tidy case for studying the methodological question 
because the recent shift in this area has been so drastic and undeniable. From the 
mid-nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth century, IHL was dominated 
by treaties. There are now dozens of IHL treaties, the principal ones being the four 
Geneva Conventions of i949 and their two Additional Protocols of i977 .'7 Customary 
'
6 Rep. of the Int'! Law Comm'n, 56th Sess., May 6-June 7, July S-Aug. 9, 2013, '75, UN Doc. N68ho. 
'7 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention II]; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Ill]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 
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IHL was always understood to operate alongside these treaties but was thought to do 
little independent work. Well into the i99os, the dominant position in the literature 
was that customary IHL, at best, reflected the most minimal provisions of the IHL 
treaties.28 Customary IHL has since flourished; it is now widely understood to exceed 
the scope of the IHL treaties. 
That shift in customary IHL resulted from a concerted effort to "fix" two 
perceived deficiencies in the treaties' scope of application. 29 First, the treaties bind 
only state parties. This is not an issue for the Geneva Conventions because they 
are universally ratified. But dozens of states, including militarily active ones, have 
either declined to ratify or attached reservations to the Additional Protocols. Most 
significantly, the United States and Israel refused to ratify the Additional Protocols 
because of fundamental disagreements with certain provisions. Several other states, 
including states that participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ratified 
the Additional Protocols with reservations.3° These nonparties and reserving parties 
create gaps in the treaty regime. 
Second, IHL developed primarily to regulate interstate conflicts ("international 
conflicts"), so the treaties under-regulate most conflicts involving armed nonstate 
groups ("non-international conflicts").31 Of the hundreds of provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions, only Article 3 - which is common to all four Conventions - applies 
in non-international conflicts. Common Article 3 establishes minimal protections 
for people in wartime.» Additional Protocol II also applies in non-international 
conflicts, but this protocol is much more rudimentary than the first, which applies in 
international conflicts. Moreover, Additional Protocol II applies by its terms only in 
extreme cases: when an armed nonstate group operates under responsible command, 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention JV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims oflnternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
'
8 See, e.g., Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), 4J 52, UN Doc. S/1994"674 Annex (May 27, 1994) ("It is probable that common 
article 3 would be viewed as a statement of customary international law, but unlikely that the other 
instruments would be so viewed."); Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Re-Envisaging the International Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict," 22 EuR. J. INT'L L. 219, 228 (zo11) ("Until the 1990s, the view that there 
were more than simply a handful of customary rules applicable in internal armed conflict was never 
seriously entertained, and identifying even those rules proved rather problematic."). 
'9 See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERT ET AL., INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAw xxxiv (zoo5) [hereinafter ICRC Study]. 
l 0 See Julie Gaudreau, "The Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims," 849 JNT'L REV. RED CROSS 143 (2003). 
l' IHL now classifies as "international" one set of conflicts against nonstate groups: conflicts involving 
national liberation movements. See Additional Protocol l, supra note 27, art. i. 
" Geneva Conventions I, II, Ill, IV, supra note 27, art. 3. 
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controls part of a state's territory, and carries out "sustained and concerted military 
operations."ii As late as i977, then, states collectively decided that international law 
would lightly regulate non-international conflicts. 
That decision became untenable with the maturation of international human 
rights law. Human rights law's initial impact on IHL was not doctrinal. Although both 
regimes aim to protect people from harm, each developed for a different context. 
IHL was designed primarily for interstate wars, while human rights law focused on 
a state's everyday relations with its own people. The two regimes might reasonably 
establish different rules for each context. Rather, human rights law's initial impact 
on IHL was conceptual. By declaring that international law is concerned with how 
states treat nonstate actors, human rights law painted as outmoded the minimal 
regulation of non-international conflicts under IHL.34 
Using CIL to correct perceived deficiencies in the treaties was an ambitious 
goal. States had deliberately limited the treaties' scope of application and had not 
shown an appetite for altering that arrangement. Moreover, the extent to which 
states were exceeding, let alone meeting, their treaty obligations - so as to create 
parallel substantive norms that apply more broadly as a matter of CIL - was, to say 
the least, unclear. Compliance with IHL has long been a problem. Nevertheless, 
the customary IHL project has been extremely successful. Although global actors 
still quibble about the content or CIL status of particular IHL norms, the prevailing 
view is now that customary IHL applies in all conflicts and is modeled not after the 
minimal treaty provisions for non-international conflicts but after the much more 
robust provisions for intemational conflicts.35 
THE PROCESS FOR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The experience with customary IHL exposes a conceptual flaw in the literature 
on method. Asking how to find CIL assumes that CIL finding is a distinct thing -
specifically, that it is meaningfully distinguishable from CIL making. Studying the 
rise of customary IHL shows that, in fact, CIL finding looks and operates much 
like CIL making. Both exercises involve constructing the preexisting data to make 
a prescriptive claim. Both are susceptible to opportunism and abuse - claims that 
push hard to change or undercut expectations, even as they pretend to reflect 
expectations. And both depend for their relevance on their reception within the 
JJ Additional Protocol II, supra note 27, art. I. 
"' See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94+!, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 4) 97 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("A 
State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented 
approach."). 
is See infra notes 51-52, 57-74, and accompanying text. 
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chaotic CIL process. The fact that the two exercises overlap so heavily calls into 
question the assumption that CIL finding is objective and disciplined, even as CIL 
making clearly is not. 
Law Finding as Lawmaking 
Decisions that purport to find CIL look a lot like decisions that aim to make CIL. 
The CIL process produces a mass of disconnected, ambiguous, and inevitably 
contradictory data. "Finding" CIL entails sifting through and advancing a prescriptive 
claim on the data - a claim that the data should be interpreted as supporting this 
or that CIL norm.36 Such decisions are usually articulated as if they describe an 
objective phenomenon: "CIL is X." In fact, the decisions construct the data and 
push CIL in a particular direction.37 Decisions that aim to make CIL use very similar 
moves. They usually assert that CIL is X in an effort to shift CIL toward X. 
Indeed, because the CIL process is so unstructured, it lacks the formal controls 
that might inhibit the participants from pushing hard for particular norms - making 
the opportunistic claims that methods for finding CIL are supposed to weed out. 
Such claims are an ordinary part of the normative contestation that occurs during 
the process for making ClL.38 Actors that participate in CIL making, such as states or 
nongovernmental advocates, might benefit from treating their own contested claims 
as law. Their legal decisions thus might contain very tendentious CIL claims. Actors 
that are specifically charged with finding CIL are presumed to stand apart from that 
process and to assess the evidence objectively. But their decisions sometimes also 
contain opportunistic or tendentious CIL claims. 
Consider the i995 Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).39 Tadic determined that, in addition to replicating 
Common Article 3 and "the core of Additional Protocol II,"4° customary IHL 
prohibits certain tactics that the treaties proscribe only in international conflicts.41 
l6 See, e.g., STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (I.A Shearer ed., nth ed. i994) ("The difficulties involved 
in extracting a customary rule or principle of international law from the mass of heterogeneous 
documentation of state practice ... are not to be minimised."). 
11 Cf. Curtis A Bradley, "Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication" 
(in this volume) (arguing that courts "find" CIL by constructing and evaluating the past practice, 
assessing state preferences, and accounting for social or moral considerations). 
38 See DAVID J' BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2002) (describing the process as one 
of "struggle and resistance," and as a "'marketplace in which states affirmatively (and self-consciously) 
'bid' and 'barter' and 'trade' in new rules of conduct"); D' AMATO, supra note i8, at 266 ("[C]ustom 
represents a type of structured legal argument that has recurred in many claim-conflict situations."). 
l9 Tadic, supra note 34. 
+0 Id. at «J 98. 
« Id. at «J 119. 
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This position was extremely expansive for the time.4-2 The overwhelmingly dominant 
view was that customary IHL at best reflected the minimal treaty provisions for 
non-international conflicts.4l Although Tadic purported only to find CIL, it pushed 
hard to create CIL. It drove customary IHL toward the treaty law for international 
conflicts.44 
The literature already recognizes that CIL finding bleeds into CIL making. But 
even scholars who underscore this point go on to ask the methodological question -
and thus to assume that the two exercises are, in some way, distinct.45 For example, 
Maurice Mendelson explains in his Hague Course that CIL creation and CIL 
application often occur simultaneously.46 Still, Mendelson insists that global actors 
need a method for finding CIL.47 His course then works through the methodological 
question. Likewise, Anthea Roberts recognizes that CIL finding involves some level 
of CIL making and that the two exercises can look alike.~ However, Roberts's stated 
purpose is to offer a new method for finding CIL. Brian Lepard's chapter in this 
volume is similar. Lepard argues for conceiving of CIL as a dynamic lawmaking 
process. Nevertheless, Lepard proposes a method for finding CIL. He argues that 
CIL should be found by sifting through a broad range of evidence and identifying 
the position that states generally believe to be desirable.49 
4' See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, "International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case," 7 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 278 (1996) ("[T]he Appeals Chamber has gone further than other bodies by 
determining that there are rules applicable to internal armed conflicts which are not based upon 
either common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II."). 
43 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
44 To be clear, Tadic recognized certain differences between the customary IHL that applies in all 
conflicts and the treaty law that applies in international conflicts. Tadic explained that "only a number 
of rules and principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply 
to internal conflicts." Tadic, supra note 34, at fj 126. But as Sandesh Sivakumaran has explained, "the 
consistent approach of the ICTY" has been to "analogize to the law of international armed conflict." 
Sivakumaran, supra note 28, at 230. Given the preexisting view of customary IHL, Tadic's push toward 
the treaty law for international conflicts was significant. 
45 See also, e.g., KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-54 (2d rev. ed. 1993) 
(recognizing that CIL "formation and ascertainment, are of course closely interdependent," but 
then insisting that "the formation of a custom and the ascertaining of custom or customary rule are 
two different notions"); Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Global Law-Making and Legal Thought," in 
LAW-MAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 1, 14-19 (Nicholas Greenwood Onuf ed., 1982) (asserting 
that "law-making and law-using tend to be aspects of the same phenomenon," but then addressing the 
question of how to find CIL). 
46 Mendelson, supra note 11, at 176 ("[l]t is not always possible or helpful to label one part [of the 
process] 'creation' and another 'application."'). 
Id. (explaining that decision makers must be able to determine "whether, at the moment the 
appreciation is being made, the practice has matured into a rule oflaw"). 
48 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, "Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customa1y International 
Law: A Reconciliation," 95 AM. J. lNT'L L. 757, 761, 763 (2001). 
49 Brian D. Lepard, "Customary International Law as a Dynamic Process" (in this volume). 
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Perhaps the distinction between CIL making and CIL finding is intended to 
capture the idea that CIL decisions vary in the extent to which they reflect, rather 
than challenge, preexisting expectations. Decisions might be said to shift from CIL 
making toward CIL finding as their prior support increases. Yet that distinction 
elides both the fluidity of the CIL process and the prescriptive effect of later-in-
time decisions. Because the CIL process is always ongoing, the meaning and relevance 
of a CIL norm fluctuate as different actors engage with it over time.5° Any decision 
relating to the norm - even a decision that might reasonably be characterized as a 
"finding" - has some prescriptive effect. As I elaborate below, Tadic would have made 
a prescriptive move even if it had more accurately reflected expectations. Adopting the 
then-dominant position on customary IHL would have helped solidify that position 
as law. This prescriptive effect might seem trivial if the position were already widely 
accepted as CIL. But in that event, any finding that the position was CIL would also 
be trivial. Decisions that purport to find CIL are most relevant when the CIL norm is 
uncertain or contested- and thus when it benefits from more prescription. 
Law Finding, Lawmaking, and the CIL Process 
Decisions that purport to find CIL and decisions that push to create CIL do not only 
look alike and make similar moves. They also operate in similar ways in the CIL 
process. This process is highly unstructured; it lacks a central authority for settling 
the law or a designated forum for ratifying or challenging particular decisions. All 
CIL decisions - decisions that aptly reflect preexisting expectations and decisions 
that push hard to alter expectations - feed into the same, chaotic process. In this 
process, a decision's relevance and impact turn not necessarily on the decision's 
prior level of support but on its reception among other actors going forward. To the 
extent that other actors seize on a decision and treat its claim as law, the claim grows 
stronger and solidifies as CIL. To the extent that they instead reject or continue to 
debate the claim, it remains vulnerable and unstable. As a practical matter, this 
means that norms that are claimed to be CIL vary considerably in their strength. 
Norms that are widely accepted and treated as law tend to be strong. Norms with 
shallower or narrower support are weaker; they might be treated as law only by some 
actors, in particular venues, or in certain respects. Decisions that purport to find 
CIL do not weed out invalid claims or stabilize CIL because they operate like other 
prescriptive claims do; they become part of the lawmaking mix. 
Consider again the Tadic decision. Tadic's position on customary IHL is now 
widely accepted not because it accurately reflected the customary IHL at the 
so See W. Michael Reisman, "International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law," 10 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1, 4-5 (1984); Mendelson, supra note 11, at 175. 
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time - it did not - but because of how the lawmaking process unfolded. States 
essentially adopted that position in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
CourtY Like Tadic, the Rome Statute maintains a distinction between international 
and non-international conflicts. The statute's list of war crimes is more abbreviated 
for non-international conflictsY But like Tadic, the statute identifies as war crimes 
much conduct that the IHL treaties do not specifically proscribe in non-international 
conflicts. States effectively converged on Tadic's claim in the Rome Statute. 
Tadic would have fed into the same process even if it had come out the other way. 
Adopting the then-dominant position on customary IHL would have helped strengthen 
that position and weaken any competing claims on the law. 111ese competing claims 
would have been more difficult to sustain because their pretense of simply reflecting 
reality would have been less plausible; they would have looked like unilateral efforts 
to change the law. Still, solidified CIL norms can deteriorate. The then-dominant 
position would have remained viable only so long as it sustained a base of support.53 
States might have agitated against that position by, for example, behaving in ways that 
reflected their discontent, openly promoting a change in the law, or simply adopting 
the Rome Statute. 
Most CIL decisions are unlike Tadic in that they are not rapidly and collectively 
endorsed. Their relevance is diffuse and drawn out. The customary IHL study 
that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published in 2005 is 
illustrative.S4 This study is much more ambitious than Tadic or the Rome Statute; it 
addresses almost all of IHL, not just the most serious violations that qualify as war 
crimes and trigger the jurisdiction of international criminal courts.SS The ICRC 
purported to find ifo rules of customary IHL that largely replicate the treaty law 
5' Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a)-8(2)(b), July i7, i998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; cf Jean-Marie Henckaerts, "Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: A Response to U.S. Comments," 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 473, 486 (2007) [hereinafter 
Henckae1ts, A Response to US Comments] ("[E]very humanitarian law treaty adopted since i996 has 
been made applicable to both international and non-international conflicts."). On this development, 
see Allison Marston Danner, "When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals 
Recast the Laws of War," 59 VAND. L. REV. I, 25-37 (2006); Claus Kress, "War Crimes Committed in 
Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice," 30 
IsR. Y.B. HUM. Rrs. 103, 104-07 (2000). 
5' Compare Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8(2)(a)-8(2)(b), with id. art. 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e). 
ll See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (6th ed. 2008) ("Generally, where states are 
seen to acquiesce in the behaviour of other states without protesting against them, the assumption must 
be that such behaviour is accepted as legitimate."); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (arguing that noncompliance undermines a norm's "compliance pull," 
making it less likely that others will comply going fo1ward); Michael J. Glennon, "How International 
Rules Die," 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 960 (2005) ("[A]t some point state practice that is inconsistent with a 
norm is simply too thick to justify the conclusion that states really accept the norm as obligatory."). 
54 JCRC Study, supra note 29. 
55 The study excludes from its scope a few discrete aspects of IHL. See id. at xxxvi-xxxvii. 
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for international conflicts but apply more broadly: to states that are not parties or 
have attached reservations to the Additional Protocols, and in non-international 
conflicts.56 As the ICRC proudly proclaimed, "State practice ... has led to the 
creation of rules parallel to those in Additional Protocol I, but applicable as 
customary law to non-international armed conflicts."57 
No matter to what extent the study reflected prior expectations - and there is 
good reason to believe that some of its conclusions were heavily prescriptive58 - it 
is now part of the CIL process and input for further lawmaking. The ICRC invokes 
and applies its own CIL positions when it educates people about IHL and tries to 
influence warring parties to comply.59 It thus helps create the expectation that its 
positions are law. Moreover, some of these positions have clearly resonated with 
other actors and helped shape customary IHL. For instance, since the study was 
published, several states have incorporated into their national laws or military 
manuals specific conclusions from the study. A few states have even replicated the 
study's precise language.60 Similarly, international and national courts have cited 
the study as evidence of CIL. 61 Courts most often cite the study for rules, such as the 
56 The study recognizes that several rules (rules 3, 4, 41, 49, 51, 106-08, 14, 130, and 145-47) might 
apply only in international conflicts. Most of these rules concern combatant status or occupations. In 
addition, the study formulates a handful of rules (rules 124, 126, 128-29) differently for international 
than for non-international conflicts. See Malcom MacLauren & Felix Schwendimann, "An Exercise 
in the Development of International Law: The New ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law," 6 GERMAN L.J. 1217, 1228-29 (2005). 
57 ICRC Study, supra note 29, at xxxv. 
58 The study was strongly criticized on methodological grounds. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III & 
William J. Haynes, II, "A U.S. Government Response to tl1e International Committee of t11e Red 
Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law," 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 443 (2007) 
(raising a litany of methodological objections); Daniel Bethlehem, "The Methodological Framework 
of the Study," in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 3, 10 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) (arguing tl1at the practice was too often 
equivocal or sparse to support the claimed CIL norms); Yoram Dinstein, "The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study," 36 [SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1 (zoo6) (questioning the weight 
that the study attributed to different kinds of data); George H. Aldrich, "Customary International 
Humanitarian Law -An Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross," 
76 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 503, 507 (2005) (asserting that tl1e study's "credibility crumbles" as a result 
of its overly expansive claims). For examples of the ICRC's responses, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
"Customary International Humanitarian Law -A Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich," 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 
525 (2006); and Henckaerts, "A Response to US Comments," supra note 5i. 
59 On the ICRC's work, see Steven R. Ratner, "Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, 
Persuasion, and the Laws of War," 22 EuR. f. IN1"L L. 459 (2011). 
00 See, e.g., ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 54, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, retrieved from https://www 
.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule54 (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (Spain); ICRC, Practice 
Relating to Rule 120, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/ 
eng/docs/v2_rul_rule120 (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (Guinea and Mexico). 
fa See, e.g., Prosecutorv. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, 4J 90 (Int'] Crim. Trib. forthe Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (on command responsibility); Janowiec v. Russia, App. 55508/o7, 58 Eur. 
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ones that define and prohibit attacks on civilian objects, that were already widely 
regarded as CIL before the study was published.62 The study has a reinforcing effect 
on these rules. As global actors repeatedly endorse a CIL claim, it grows stronger and 
more difficult to refute. It solidifies as CIL. 
The reactions to other positions in the study have been more mixed, and the normative 
contestation that is endemic to CIL remains apparent. Consider the study's core claim 
that customary IHL is modeled after the treaty law for international conflicts. This 
claim is now widely accepted at a high level of abstraction.63 But the claim's relevance 
and meaning continue to be unstable. IHL experts who take the claim for granted still 
disagree on how to translate into the customary IHL for non-international conflicts the 
treaty law that was designed for international conflicts.64 This disagreement is evident, 
for example, in the controversy surrounding the ICRC's 2009 Interpretive Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities.65 The Interpretive Guidance was meant 
to help clarify an issue that lies at the heart of IHL: when may someone be targeted for 
attack? IHL treaties answer the question for international conflicts: members of state 
armed forces generally identify themselves as such, comprise the fighting class, and are 
targetable.66 The rule for civilians is the reverse: civilians are generally not targetable 
because they are presumed not to participate in the fighting. Under Additional Protocol 
I, civilians are targetable only if they directly participate in hostilities.67 Those treaty 
rules translate poorly to non-international conflicts in which the combatant-civilian 
distinction breaks down.68 The Interpretive Guidance sought to resolve the targeting 
H.R. Rep. 30 4J i57 (zoy.) (on duty to investigate war crimes); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 632 
(2006) (on trying people before a "regularly constituted court"); Al-Sirri v. Sec. State for Home Dept., 
[2013] 1 AC. 745, 787 (U.K.) (on attacking peacekeeping personnel); HCJ 3799/02, Adalah Legal 
Center v. IDF Central Commander [2005] (2) lsr. 206, 4J 20 (lsr.) (on advance warnings of attacks that 
might affect civilians). 
fo Compare, e.g., ICRC Study, supra note 29, at 29-32, with Prosecutor v. Kordic and C~erkez, Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, No. IT _95-4/2-PT, 4J 15-31(Mar.2, i999); Prosecutorv. Hadzihasanovic 
6 Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73-3, Decision on the Joint Defence, •J 30 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. n, 2005); and Prosecutor v. Carda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, n.130 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
61 See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, Tm: LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CoNFLJCT 56-57, 6i (2012). 
<ii For a discussion and critique of this method, see Monica Hakimi, "A Functional Approach to 
Targeting and Detention," 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012). 
65 NILS MELZER, !CRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
1-IOSTILJTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 1-IllMANITARIAN LAW (2009). 
66 On the people who qualify as combatants, see Geneva Convention III, supra note 27, art. 4; and 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 27, arts. i(4), 43-44. On the point that members of state armed forces 
must identify themselves as such, see Geneva Convention III, supra note 27, art. 4; and Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 44(3). On the well-accepted exceptions to this targeting rule, see 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 4i. 
67 Additional Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 51(3). 
68 See Hakimi, supra note 64, at 1377-79, 1398-D3; see also Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, "Teaching 
an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare," 1 HARV. 
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rules that apply, mostly as a matter of customary IHL, in these conflicts. Its conclusions 
were heavily criticized.69 
Separately, the ICRC's core claim is under pressure from actors who question 
the extent to which customary IHL, as modeled after the treaty law for international 
conflicts, is even the appropriate regulatory framework for modern conflicts. Now 
more than ever, domestic courts, human rights institutions, and civil society groups 
appraise situations involving armed nonstate groups. These decisionmakers are 
not especially invested in "pure" IHL, and they regularly invoke and apply hybrids 
that mix IHL with norms from other sources.7° For example, the Israeli Supreme 
Court has used domestic law to modify the norms that, in its view, would have 
applied as a matter of customary IHL.71 The European Court of Human Rights 
has repeatedly applied human rights law, instead of IHL, to situations that are also 
covered by IHL.72 And civil society groups regularly invoke their preferred versions 
of IHL to condemn conduct that is consistent with more mainstream positions on 
IHL.73 IHL purists might insist that these moves do not affect IHL because they are 
NAT'L SECURITY f. 45, 53 (2010) (asserting that "new warfare" is "characterized by fighting in highly 
populated areas with a blurring of the lines between military forces and civilian persons and objects"). 
69 For an analysis of the areas of agreement and disagreement, see Hakimi, supra note 64, at 1377-79, 
1398-03. For evidence of the disagreement, see, for example, W. Hays Parks, "Part IX of the ICRC 
'Direct Participation in Hostilities' Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect," 42 
N.Y.U. f. lNT'L L. 6 POL. 769 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, "The Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis," 1 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY f. 5 (2010); 
Kenneth Watkin, "Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 'Direct Participation 
in Hostilities' Interpretive Guidance," 42 N.Y.U. f. INT'L L. 6 POL .. 641 (2010); Bill Boothby, '"And 
for Such Time as': The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities," 42 N. Y. U. f. INT'L 
L. 6 POL .. 741 (2010). 
1° The ICRC study incorporates human rights law to the extent that the norms in human rights law are 
analogous to the ones in IHL. However, the study does not try to resolve any discrepancies between 
the two regimes. See lCRC Study, supra note 29, at xxxvi-xxxvii. 
1• HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in lsr. v. Israel, 2006(2) Isr. Rep. 459, 490-95 [2005] (Isr.). 
7' See, e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791 (2005); Al-Skeini v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2on). The court's approach in these cases might 
be justified on the ground that the court's mandate is to apply human rights law, not IHL. This 
justification is incomplete. Other bodies with similar mandates have occasionally applied IHL. See, 
e.g., Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala, Case n.129, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, at 321 (Nov. 
25, 2000); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Croatia, ~ 9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/ 
Add.15 (Dec. 28, 1992). 
73 Compare, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 19 ("The protection to which civilian 
hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian 
duties, acts harmful to the enemy."); and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF 
THE WAR AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 73 (2003) ("By using hospitals as militaiy headquarters, 
Iraqi forces turned them into military objectives."); with ANTHONY H. CoRDESJVV\N, THE "GAZA 
WAR": A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 65-66 (2009) (claiming that Hamas used a hospital as a military base 
during the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict); and DAN MAGEN, "ILL MORALS": GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF THE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH DURING THE ]SRAELI ASSAULT ON GAZA 41-44 (Ran Yaron ed., Saul Vardi et al. 
trans., 2009) (condemning Israel's attacks on hospitals in Gaza in 2008-2009). 
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external to the regime or plainly opportunistic. But the moves unquestionably shape 
expectations on whether and how IHL applies - either as a matter of treaty law or as 
a matter of customary law that is modeled after the treaties. The ICRC's "finding" 
that customary IHL is modeled after the treaty law for international conflicts has not 
suppressed these competing positions or stabilized the law in this area.74 
In short, although the IC1Y and ICRC purported only to find CIL, they actually 
helped make CIL. They advanced particular CIL claims. These claims fed back into 
the CIL process, as other prescriptive claims do. And like other claims, their viability 
has turned on how the process has unfolded. Some claims already had support and 
have grown stronger. Other claims were tendentious when they were made but have 
since gained legal traction. Still others are contested, which means that the putative 
norms will continue to be invoked and applied inconsistently, depending on who is 
acting and in which forum.75 This is how the CIL process works. It works this way no 
matter to what extent a particular decision aims to reflect or to challenge preexisting 
expectations. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The argument that CIL finding is not meaningfully distinguishable from CIL making 
has two important practical implications. First, nonstate actors who are charged 
with finding CIL can be extremely influential in making CIL. Second, no method 
for finding CIL is likely to discipline these actors or help settle CIL, so long as the 
process for making CIL remains as it is. I address each of these implications in tum. 
Participants in the Process 
Because CIL finding and CIL making are intertwined, nonstate actors who are 
charged with finding CIL sometimes play a significant role in making CIL. The 
dominant view in the literature - which all but the most esoteric methods for finding 
74 Indeed, even the ICRC acknowledges that "the study should not be seen as the final word on 
customary IHL because it cannot be exhaustive and because the formation of CIL is an ongoing 
process." Henckaerts, A Response to U.S. Comments, supra note 5L 
1s Cf W. Michael Reisman, 'The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes 
and the Differentiation of Their Application," in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREA1Y 
MAKING 15, 28-29 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben eds., 2005) [hereinafter Reisman, Democratization]: 
Because the question of whether international law will be effective in a particular dispute will 
increasingly depend upon the arena or forum in which the dispute is heard, scholarly and 
practitioner statements of what the law is, which are provided to clients to assist them in their 
planning, will increasingly have to be qualified by reference to where a potential dispute in 
the future may be initially characterized in terms oflaw and where those characterizations will 
thereafter be put to political use. 
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CIL reinforce - is that states drive the formation of CIL.76 That view rests, again, on 
the distinction between CIL finding and CIL making. Nonstate actors are known 
to find CIL but are said to play a marginal or subsidiary role in making CIL. The 
experience with customary IHL suggests otherwise. The ICTY and ICRC have not 
just participated in making CIL; they have had a significant impact. 
The conventional view is incompatible with the very nature of the CIL process. 
Because the process is unstructured, it lacks the formal mechanisms that might 
exclude certain participants. Anyone can make a claim on CIL. Of course, some 
actors are more influential than others; some push harder, command a broader 
audience, or are more effective in promoting their views.77 Yet there is no reason 
to believe that states alone are capable of exercising outsized influence. Other 
kinds of actors might be influential in part because they are not states - and thus 
are perceived not to be advancing particular, nationalistic agendas. International 
courts and tribunals, high-level officials of intergovernmental bodies, and expert 
nongovernmental groups often have an authority, at least in the eyes of some relevant 
audiences, that individual states lack.78 These actors can be extremely influential in 
shaping expectations about CIL. In the face of ambiguity or competition - "CIL 
is X," "no, CIL is Y" - the claim that appears authoritative tends to be sticky.79 
Competing claims might still be advanced, but these claims become harder to 
sustain. Their pretense of describing CIL becomes less credible once an actor with 
some authority has said otherwise. 
The literature already recognizes that two nonstate institutions - the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Law Commission - sometimes shape 
CIL. A recent volume on the ICJ concludes that its "decisions are accorded 'a 
truly astonishing deference'" in international law.80 Several CIL claims that were 
16 See sources cited at supra note 5. 
11 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger., Den., Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20) (explaining 
that states that are especially invested in an issue play a larger role in creating the relevant CIL 
than do states that are disengaged); Michael Byers, "Introduction: Power, Obligation, and Customary 
International Law," 11 DUKE f. COMP. 6 1N1"L L. 81, 84 (2001) (explaining that powerful states can 
play an outsized role). 
13 See Harlan Grant Cohen, "Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community," 
44N.Y. U. f. lNT'L L. 6 POL. 1049 (2012); W. Michael Reisman, "International Law-Making: A Process 
of Communication," 75 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 101, 110 (1981). 
79 Cf Fernando Lusa Bordin, "Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification 
Conventions and the !LC Draft Articles in International Law," 63 INT'L 6 COMP. L.Q. 535, 547 (2014) 
("[I]t is the inherent uncertainty by which customary international law is characterized that accounts 
for the influence that non-legislative [i.e., non-binding] codifications exercise."); Andrew T. Guzman 
& Timothy L. Meyer, "International Common Law: The Soft Law oflntemational Tribunals," 9 CHI. 
J. lNT'L L. 515, 516-17 (2009) (characterizing as "soft law" the decisions of institutions that, although 
lacking in formal authority, shape expectations about the law). 
8
° Christian J. Tams, "The ICJ as a 'Law-Formative Agency': Summary and Synthesis," in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF fllSTICE 377, 379 
(Christian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013). 
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controversial when the ICJ endorsed them have since "come to be accepted.'% 
Similarly, the International Law Commission is known to engage in some lawmaking 
as it codifies CIL.82 Its prescriptive moves can be significant. For instance, the provisions 
on countermeasures in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility were extremely 
controversial during the commission's work on that project.83 Now that the commission 
has adopted those provisions, they are regularly cited as CIL.8.+ 
And yet, the conventional view is still that nonstate actors participate in CIL 
making only at the margins or by "finding" what states do or believe. Much of the 
literature posits that nonstate actors have, at best, a peripheral or subsidiary role in 
CIL making.8s A common refrain is that they participate only to the extent that states 
delegate lawmaking authority to them or subsequently endorse their CIL positions. 
For example, Allison Danner has argued that Tadic's effect on CIL is best explained 
by states' tacit delegation of lawmaking authority to the ICTY.86 Anthea Roberts and 
Sandesh Sivakumaran likewise cite Tadic for the proposition that "[a]ny role that 
state-empowered bodies play in law creation is thus dependent on initial state consent 
and at least some level of ongoing state consent."87 
8
• Id.; see also, e.g., Antonio Cassese, "The International Court ofJustice: It is High Time to Restyle the 
Respected Old Lady," in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 240 (Antonio 
Cassese ed., 2012) ("Once the !CJ has stated that a legal standard is part of customaiy international 
law, few would seriously challenge such a finding."); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, "The United Nations 
and International Law-Making," 3fo RECUEJL DES CouRS 11, 29, 38 (2012) ("[T)he International Court 
has been involved ... on occasion, in making international law, by declaring a particular practice as 
having become 'customary international law."'). 
8
' BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at i74; Bordin, supra note 79, at 542-46. 
83 See Koskenniemi, supra note 22, at 340. 
11.i See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. The United Mexican States, IC SID Case No. ARB(AF)/o+fo5, 
Award, •f•i 125-80 (Nov. 21, 2007), retrieved from http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (search 
"Archer Daniels"); Com Prods. Int'/ v. The United Mexican States, IC SID Case No., ARB(AF)/04/01, 
Decision on Responsibility, •f•f 144-92 (Jan. 15, 2008), retrieved from http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
Index.jsp (search "corn products"). 
85 See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 5, at 144 ("Even if (or when) the individual is formally recognized 
as a legitimate participant in the creation of CIL, the state will continue to hold this position of 
prominence."); Mendelson, supra note 11, at 203 (asse1ting that nonstate actors participate only 
indirectly in the formation of CIL, by influencing other actors); cf Reisman, Democratization, supra 
note 75, at 19-24 (underscoring that nonstate actors regularly participate in international lawmaking 
but noting that treaty law and CIL are still largely made by states). As discussed, the literature does 
recognize that the !CJ can play a significant role in CIL making. But many scholars who recognize this 
point still try to link the IC J's role to states. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, "Customary International Law as 
a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency," in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 85, 86-87 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (arguing that the !CJ "has, in 
fact, the authority to invent the custom," as "a sort of trustee acting in the best interests of the states 
and the global community," and that "States accept and welcome such leaps."). 
86 Danner, supra note 51, at 47-48. 
87 Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups 
in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law," 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 107, 117-18 (2012). 
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Those accounts are unconvincing. Any delegation of lawmaking authority to the 
ICTY or ICRC was, at best, implicit and incomplete. Danner herself recognizes that, 
when the ICTY was created, several states asserted that the ICTY was only to apply 
existing CIL, not to help make CIL. 88 In addition, states had not committed to accepting 
the ICTY's positions. True, Tadic's CIL positions were soon endorsed by states, but the 
same cannot be said of the I CRC' s. The I CRC study is very much a nongovernmental 
product. States did not participate in drafting the sh1dy, and most states responded with 
silence when the study was released.89 Nevertheless, the study has clearly been shaping 
customary IHL. 
Of course, states continue to play a role in this process. A CIL claim that many 
states reject will have little legal traction, no matter whether that claim is advanced 
by a nonstate actor, such as the ICRC, or by a state. The point is that nonstate actors 
can participate in the formation of CIL just as - and sometimes more effectively 
than - individual states can. Where a CIL norm is uncertain or contested, a nonstate 
actor's "finding" can tip the scale toward one side or the other. Indeed, the principal 
threat to the ICRC's core claim on customary IHL appears to be coming not from 
states -which are still equivocal when engaging with IHL - but from other nonstate 
actors. Recall that human rights institutions and civil society groups are resisting the 
idea that customary IHL, as modeled after the treaty law for international conflicts, 
is the appropriate regulatory framework for many modern conflicts. 
Method as Discipline 
One response might be to criticize the ICTY and ICRC for exceeding their 
mandates and trying to make CIL. Sure, all CIL finding involves some level of CIL 
making. But those who are charged with finding CIL are supposed to be objective 
and disciplined; their prescriptive discretion should be constrained.9° And, the 
88 Danner, supra note 51, at 21 ("Many delegates asserted that the Tribunals could not create new law."); 
see also UN Secreta1y-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808,, 34, UN Doc. S/RES/808 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 ILM n63 (asserting 
that the ICIT was to apply only norms that were "beyond any doubt part of customary law"). 
89 The International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent - which consists of states did ask 
the ICRC to prepare a report on customary IHL. ICRC, From Law to Action: Report on the Follow-Up 
to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, 26th International Conference 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Res. 1 (Dec 3-7, 1995). But this request cannot reasonably be 
characterized as a delegation of CIL making authority or an endorsement of whatever substantive 
positions the ICRC would take. States did not themselves work on the study. And to the extent that 
governmental experts were consulted, they were consulted in their personal capacities and only once 
the study was very far along. See Iain Scobbie, "The Approach to Customary International Law in the 
Study," in PERSPECTNES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTE:RNAT!ONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
supra note 58, 15, 16-17. 
90 Cf D'ASPREMONT, supra note 20, at 168 ("[T]he idea that courts and tribunals are expressly endowed 
with custom-making power is not yet accepted."); Mendelson, supra note 11, at 178 ("[T]he role of the 
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logic goes, their discretion might be constrained if the proper method for finding 
CIL were refined. Indeed, this logic motivates much of the focus on method in 
the CIL literature: identifying the proper method for finding CIL should impose 
some discipline on and help settle CIL. However, global actors are unlikely to 
be methodologically disciplined, unless they believe that using an accepted method 
matters - for example, that it enhances the efficacy or legitimacy of their decisions. 
The evidence that they do is weak. After all, their decisions feed into the same chaotic 
process no matter whether they are or are not methodologically restrained. 
The proper method for finding CIL is especially contested where, as in IHL, 
the relevant norms relate to human dignity or security. States commonly endorse 
these norms discursively but deviate from them in the operational practice. The 
methodological question asks how to assess those inconsistencies - specifically, 
how to account for the abhorrent physical practice. That practice arguably prevents 
the norms from attaining the status of CIL. Many international lawyers thus 
defend the so-called modem method for finding CIL.91 This method generally 
downplays the unsavory physical practice and emphasizes instead the positive verbal 
pronouncements.92 Different variants of the modern method give the physical 
practice more or less weight. 
The variant that is now within the mainstream of legal thinking - but not by any 
means universally accepted93 - is the one that the ICJ endorsed in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.94 The Nicaragua court made two 
key methodological moves. First, it treated verbal acts as state practice.95 Verbal acts 
that support a norm thus might counterbalance the physical acts that undercut the 
norm. Second, the court discounted the physical acts that states themselves did not 
own.96 Bad physical conduct might not detract from a CIL finding if states condemn 
or try to justify that conduct by reference to the norm. 
judge is to be an impartial third party, and so far as possible to take an objective photograph, as it were, 
of the state of the law, frozen at a particular moment in time."). 
9• See e.g., Henckaerts, A Response to U.S. comments, supra note 51, at 4 78-80 (defending this approach 
in the ICRC study on the ground that the alternative is to permit "violators [to] dictate the law or stand 
in the way of rules emerging"). 
9' See Roberts, supra note 48, at 758-60. 
9l See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, "The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, ]us Cogens, and 
General Principles," 1988-89 AuSTL. Y. B. INT'L L. 82; Prosper Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?" 77 AM. ]. INT'L L. 413, 434-35 (1983). 
94 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, •1•1 
i83-207 (June 27). For scholars who embrace this method, see, for example, THEODOR MERON, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 94 (1989); and Charney, supra note 
2, at 545-46. 
95 Nicaragua, supra note 94, •1•1 i83-207; see also ILA Report, supra note 1, at n.32 (citing Nicaragua for 
the same). 
96 Nicaragua, supra note 94, 41 i86. 
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As the Nicaragua court articulated its method, it licensed CIL finders not to 
ignore the bad practice but rather to weigh that practice against the data that support 
a putative norm. Yet when the court applied its method, it appeared not even to 
account for the bad practice. Nicaragua relied entirely on verbal evidence to support 
its CIL claims.97 That approach to method is part of a broader pattern: the ICJ does 
not consistently use the method that it itself propounds.98 The court regularly finds 
CIL on the basis of scant evidentiary support or without conducting the kind of 
exhaustive review that its method seems to require.99 Still, the court does focus on 
method; once it articulates a particular method, it arguably limits its discretion to 
"find" the CIL norms that it prefers. At the very least, Nicaragua needed solid verbal 
evidence to offset the unsavory physical practice. 
The ICTY and ICRC decisions are striking, however, in that they expressly 
endorse very unconventional methods.1°0 Tadic plainly pushed past Nicaragua. 
Whereas Nicaragua insisted that the operational practice matters, Tadic did not. 101 
Tadic offered "a word of caution" about even trying to consider that practice: 
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint ... whether [troops] in fact comply 
with, or disregard, certain standards of behavior. This examination is rendered 
extremely difficult by the fact that not only is access to the theater of military 
operations normally refused to independent observers ... but information on the 
actual conduct of hostilities is withheld by the parties to the conflict; what is worse, 
97 See, e.g., John Tasioulas, "In Defense of Relative Normativity: Communiatarian Values and the 
Nicaragua Case," i6 OXFORD f. LEGAL STUD. 85, 97 (1996). 
98 See, e.g., BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 279 ("[T]he [ICJ] has not been consistent in applying 
its own criteria for the determination of customary international law."); RudolfH. Geiger, "Customary 
International Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: A Critical Appraisal," in 
FROM BJLATERALJSM TO COMMUNJTY INTEREST: Ess,ws IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 673, 
692 (Ulrich Fastenrath, et. al. eds., 2011) ("In general the Court does not follow its self-proclaimed 
method of finding customary international law."). 
99 See, e.g., Alain Pellet, "Shaping the Future of International Law: The Role of the World Court in 
Lawmaking," in LOOKJNG TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERl\ATrONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MlCHAEL 
RErSMAN 1065, 1076 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et. al., eds., 2011) (asserting that the International Court 
of Justice has a "marked tendency to assert the existence of a customary rule more than to prove it"); 
see also Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, "Customary International Law: How do Courts Do It?" (in 
this volume) (showing that international courts generally ignore the traditional method and instead 
"find" CIL by looking to treaties). 
'°0 Judge Meron has asserted that the ICTY and ICRC used fairly rigorous methods for finding CIL. See 
Meron, "The Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law," 99AM. f. INT'L L. 817, 817 (2005). However, 
Meron calls these methods rigorous against a background understanding that the proper method is 
generally quite relaxed and flexible. He endorses a method that allows for considerable prescriptive 
discretion - and that many others reject. 
'°' Tadic, supra note 34, ~ 99; see also Theodor Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the 
Formation of International Humanitarian Law," 90 AM. /. INT'L L. 238, 239-40 (1996) (explaining 
that the tribunal used verbal acts to "compensate for scarcity of supporting practice"). 
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often recourse is had to misinformation with a view to misleading the enemy as well 
as public opinion and foreign Governments.102 
The tribunal here is not using an accepted method for finding CIL. It does not even 
pretend to be methodologically disciplined. 
The ICRC's approach was different. The ICRC at least claimed that the 
operational practice mattered.101 Yet like the court in Nicaragua, the ICRC appeared 
to pay little, if any, attention to that practice. 104 The data that it collected to support 
its CIL claims are overwhelmingly verbal in forrn. 105 Further, after claiming that the 
operational practice mattered, the ICRC invoked an extremely expansive method that 
rendered that practice irrelevant. The ICRC asserted that certain norn1s qualify as CIL, 
notwithstanding the extensive practice to the contrary and the absence of any opinio 
juris: "It appears that international courts and tribunals on occasion conclude that a 
rule of customary international law exists when the rule is a desirable one ... for the 
protection of the human person, provided that there is no important contrary opinio 
juris."106 
However one assesses the ICTY's and ICRC's methods in the abstract, they become 
much more dubious as applied to IHL. Neither institution seriously grappled with 
the IHL treaties that contradicted its CIL claims. Several states expressly rejected the 
treaty provisions that the ICTY or ICRC characterized as CIL.107 And the states that 
negotiated the treaties deliberately did not extend to non-international conflicts the 
panoply of norms that govern international conflicts. The literature on method suggests 
that CIL can supersede a contrary treaty arrangement only if the treaty parties so intend; 
the evidentiary burden is thought to be substantial. 108 The ICTY and ICRC did not 
'°' Tadic, supra note 34, •f 99· 
Jn3 ICRC Study, supra note 29, at xxxviii, xliiv-xliv 
'°+ Elizabeth Wilmshurst, "Conclusions," in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 58, 401, 402-03 (summarizing the views of several 
commentators by concluding that "the authors of the Study have sometimes adopted an approach 
which is less conservative than is claimed" and on occasion "fairly relaxed"). 
ws See generally ICRC, Practice, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/ 
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2 (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
'
06 ICRC Study, supra note 29, at xlviii (emphasis added). 
'°' The ICRC study claimed to pay particular attention to the practice of states that are not party to the 
Additional Protocols. ICRC Study, supra note 29, at 1. But the weight that the ICRC gave to this 
practice is unclear. The ICRC also took into account the practice of states that are party and "the fact 
that, at the time of this writing, Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 162 States and Additional 
Protocol II by 157 States." Id. 
wB See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, n. 4 (1987) 
("Provisions in international agreements are superseded by principles of customary law that develop 
subsequently, where the parties to the agreement so intend."); Michael Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of 
the Sources of International Law," 47 BRI'f. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 276 (1977) ("[S]ubsequent custom can 
terminate a treaty only when there is clear evidence that that is what the parties intend."). 
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even try to satisfy that burden. The ICRC, in particular, was criticized for trying to use 
CIL to circumvent the limitations in the IHL treaties. 109 
Surely, the ICTY and ICRC realized that their methods were outside the 
mainstream. They presumably used these methods because more conventional ones 
would have complicated their efforts to achieve their desired results. Their mandates 
to find CIL did not constrain them from openly invoking and using dubious methods 
to try to make CIL. And their methodological indiscipline appears to have had little, 
if any, effect on how their decisions were received. Refining the method for finding 
CIL is unlikely to alter this incentive structure. Rather, actors who have a normative 
agenda are likely to continue advancing heavily prescriptive claims, even when they 
are charged only with finding CIL. These claims will sometimes be effective. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of how to find CIL assumes that finding CIL is an objective exercise 
that stands apart from the messy process for making CIL. I have used the experience 
with customary IHL to cast doubt on that assumption. My argument here should not 
be entirely surprising. The scholarly literature already recognizes that CIL finding 
entails some degree of CIL making; that actors who purport to find CIL commonly 
help shape CIL; and that these actors routinely disregard their own professed 
CIL-finding methods. What is surprising is that, even as the literature recognizes 
these points, it insists that CIL finding is different from CIL making and can impose 
some order on the CIL process. This persistent focus on method reflects, at bottom, 
a deep discomfort with the volatility and political excess of that process. Global 
actors sometimes invoke and treat as CIL norms that are, in fact, novel or contested. 
Methods for finding CIL are, I have argued, unlikely to discipline these actors or to 
reduce the contestation and uncertainty in CIL. 
These methods might do other work. At the very least, the methodological 
guideposts provide a shared language that disparate actors use to advance varied 
"'9 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, My Initial Reactions to the lCRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, KENNETH ANDERSON'S LAW OF WAR AND JusT THEORY BLOG, retrieved 
from http: //kennethand ersonlawofwar. blogspot. com/2005/11/my-ini tial-reactions-to-icrc-customary 
.html (accessed Nov. 14, 2015) ("In very important, very disturbing ways, the Study represents a sort of 
customary law 'end run' around the failure of Protocol I to achieve near universal or customary status 
itself."); Scobbie, supra note 89, at 34 ("Can States be expected to accept as customary that which 
they have rejected as a conventional obligation?"); Bethlehem, supra note 58, at 8 ("Particularly 
when heavy reliance is placed on treaties to which a number of States are not parties, initiatives to 
derive customary rules may be seen as an attempt to circumvent the requirement of express consent 
necessary for a State to be bound by the treaty-based rule."); Aldrich, supra note 58, at 505-06 
("[S]ubstantive and public dissent by at least some [non-parties] to various provisions of the Protocol 
makes it impossible to suggest that the Protocol ... should be considered to represent as a whole a 
codification of customary international humanitarian law."). 
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international norms. Moreover, any individual actor might craft and use a method 
that helps achieve its own goals. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court now uses a 
method in the human rights context that is intended to restrict the CIL claims that 
U.S. courts assess or endorse.110 A nongovernmental advocate might use a very loose 
method to pressure states to change their behavior. The point is that no one method 
for finding CIL is likely to help settle or impose order on CIL. 
This does not mean that "anything goes" in CIL. It means that the limits on 
CIL must - and do - come from within the CIL process. Actors might refrain from 
advancing controversial CIL claims for all sorts of reasons that are internal to that 
process. A controversial claim might be less stable and therefore less appealing to 
advance than is a widely accepted compromise. The controversial claim might 
detract from an actor's credibility with particular audiences. Or the claim might be 
challenged or ignored. Indeed, this is probably the strongest constraint on CIL: for 
a CIL claim to be effective, it must actually resonate with other actors. Others must 
be willing to treat the claim as law. 
110 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) ("[W]e think courts should require any claim 
based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the i8th-century paradigms 
we have recognized."). 
